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ABSTRACT
The author offers a discourse analysis of  inter-religious relations 
during the New Order (1965-1998) in Indonesia. The relations 
between the Muslim majority and Christian minority were tense in 
this period. Muslims and Christian disagreed on how to interpret 
the law concerning freedom of  religion and tolerance. Muslims 
claimed that Christians used foreign aid for 'Christianization' and 
'Westernization. Christians, on the other hand, claimed that 
Muslims curtailed the freedom of  religion of  Christians by acts of  
intolerance and violence. Meanwhile, then president Suharto tried 
to be seen as impartial, for he considered economic prosperity 
more important than religion.
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ndonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world; around 178 Imillion or 88 percent of  the population is Muslim. However, 
Indonesia is also known as the most culturally and religiously heterogeneous 
state, where other great world religions like Christianity, Hinduism, 
Buddhism and other indigenous, ethnic faith traditions have roots and have 
grown with Islam over the past hundreds of  years. The most significant 
religious minority in the country and the closest rival to Islam is Christianity, 
which comprises around 18 million or 9 percent of  the population with an 
average growth rate of  2.4 percent annually, a growth rate which is 
remarkably higher than the total population growth rate of  Indonesia 
1
(1.83%).  Moreover, some provinces outside Java, such as East 
2
Nusatenggara, Papua, North Sulawesi and Maluku, are largely Christian.
Both Islam and Christianity are monotheistic and missionary in 
orientation. As universal religions, they are anchored on the conviction that 
God's commands cannot be confined with in a particular community but 
3
must be proclaimed and acknowledged all over the world.  Such theological 
understanding serves as the motivating force that drives both to fulfill their 
missionary function as faithfully as they can. Not to follow such 'divine' 
mandate is to go against the will and purpose of  God for the salvation of  the 
world and humankind. Obviously, this universalistic concept of  religion that 
calls for universal and absolute claims can be a source of  conflict. In the 
process of  fulfilling their divinely appointed missionary tasks tensions and 
conflicts often arise. History is replete with cases and events that show a grim 
picture of  conflicts and bloody wars between these two great traditions.
The Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia can be traced back to at least 
the Dutch colonial period and has been significantly affected by colonial and 
state policies and actions. One very prominent concern that has been the 
bone of  contentions between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia and has 
significantly affected Muslim-Christian relations until now is the 
'Christianization' issue. This issue has a long historical root that started in the 
Dutch colonial period when the Dutch policies were seen as more favorable 
to Christians but biased against Muslims. The activities of  Dutch missionary 
4
were viewed as an attempt to eliminate Islam in favor of  Christianity.  
Discrimination created animosities, not only between Muslims and the 
Dutch, but also between Muslims and Christians. The special treatment 
received by Christians from the Dutch was deeply resented by Muslims who 
5
held Christians and the Dutch as 'two sides of  the same coin'.  The strife 
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between Muslims and Christians continued and was aggravated during the 
Old Order period. Here, the Christianization issue was again brought to the 
surface when the Sukarno government lifted restrictions to missionary 
activities, which paved the way for widespread missionary endeavors in 
different parts of  Indonesia.
With the shift of  presidency from Sukarno to Soeharto, Muslim-
Christian relations were still unpleasant. It was observed that some policies 
and actions of  the New Order Government had significantly heightened 
tensions between Muslims and Christians and it was during this period when 
the Christianization issue had become more prevalent. Soeharto's strategy of  
weakening political Islam had a significant bearing on the relationship 
between Muslims and Christians in the New Order period as some of  its 
methodology involved Christians. Muslims hoped that after the 
extermination of  Communism, which was perceived as a victory of  Islam, 
and with Soeharto's rise to power Islam will play a major role in Indonesian 
society. Muslims had a double agenda: pushing an Islamic State and reviving 
the Masyumi. But hopes to establish an Islamic state and to revive political 
Islam failed as the Soeharto government opposed it. Muslims saw it as serial 
defeats following on from the battles to decide the philosophical basis of  the 
state during the years 1945-1959. This disappointment, coupled with some 
government policies, added more problems to the already escalating tension 
between Muslims and Christians. Key leaders occupying sensitive and higher 
positions in the government who were Christians and rich businessmen also 
surrounded Soeharto. This increased suspicion among Muslims that 
Christians had been working with the government to eradicate Islamic 
6
political power.  Supporters of  Masyumi also accused Christians of  using 
7
social programs as a pretext for proselytizing.
This paper analyzes critically the dynamics of  Muslim-Christian relations 
in New Order Indonesia as manifested in the way both religious traditions 
have interacted with certain socio-political and religious issues that 
concerned them. More specifically, I analyze the socio-political contexts and 
bases of  the 'Christianization' discourses produced by representative Muslim 
leaders and how representative Christian leaders have responded to them. 
Moreover, this study also shows how the New Order Government 
responded to Christianization issues in terms of  government policies and 
actions. Also, it is significant to see how both Muslims and Christians reacted 
to such policies and actions. This paper, however, does not attempt to 
present a generalized Islamic and Christian view on the 'Christianization' 
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issue, but only representative Islamic and Christian views as gleaned from 
specific discourses of  well-known Islamic and Christian figures who were 
directly involved in the issue during the New Order Era.
Representative Muslim Views and Discourses on the threats of  
Christianization
The Muslims' perceptions on the issue of  Christianization are best 
described in the way they reacted to at least four significant factors that took 
place during the New Order period, namely: firstly, he massive conversion of  
Indonesians to Christianity; secondly, the lifting of  restrictions and 
reopening of  missionary activities; thirdly, the building of  Christian 
churches and other Christian institutions among predominantly Muslim 
communities; and fourthly, the issue of  foreign aid for Christian missionary 
activities.
After the demise of  the Communist party in 1966, a state policy was 
issued for all Indonesian citizens to affiliate with one of  the five officially 
recognized religions. This was seen as important to dissociate Indonesians 
from Communism, which had become the common enemy of  the state. In 
1965 the PKI was outlawed, and hundreds and thousands of  its followers 
were summarily executed. Muslim youth groups had connived with some 
military to carry out the program of  eliminating PKIs from village to village 
8
and killing suspected communists.  In this highly tensed atmosphere it was 
extremely dangerous not to be able to claim affiliation with a recognized 
religion lest one be accused of  being a communist or atheist. Ricklefs 
observes that the vast majority of  the converts at that time were Javanists, 
9
who were seeking protection from Muslim charges that they lacked religion.  
This political phenomenon had caused a great number of  Indonesians to 
embrace Christianity. It was reported that in a span of  six years (1966-71) 
more than two million Javanese were converted to Christianity. Christians 
claim that the 1960's had witnessed the revival of  Christianity in Indonesia. 
This claim was backed up by the following statistical data: the increase of  the 
Catholic population from 1966-1967 reached 7.45%. It was also reported 
that after 1965 in Central Java, sometimes the number of  people waiting for 
10
Catholic baptism was more than the number of  parish membership.  
Significant growth was also observed among Protestant churches. For 
example, the membership of  the Indonesian Baptist Churches increased 
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rapidly from 1,317 in 1960 to 3,391 in 1965.   Also, from July to August 1966 
the East Java Christian Church baptized nearly 10,000 persons. The Karo 
Batak Protestant Church baptized over 26,000 persons between1966 to 
12
1967.  This unprecedented conversion made a dramatic increase in the 
Christian population in Indonesia and was hailed by many mission scholars 
as “the largest group of  people (in modern times) ever to become Christians 
13
of  a Muslim background.”
How this massive conversion of  Indonesians, especially Javanese, to 
Christianity is supposed to be interpreted has puzzled many scholars of  
religion. There are a number of  explanations and interpretations that link 
this phenomenon to a variety of  factors. Some Indonesian scholars suggest 
that this phenomenal conversion should be linked to wider processes of  
transformation, that is, religious, political and economic. They believe that 
the massive religious conversion of  1965 and onward should be understood 
against the backdrop of  government pressures and policies which required 
all citizens to embrace an official religion. They also observe that some 
Indonesians decided to become Christian, because they felt there had been 
too much tension between Islam and communism. Christianity perhaps was 
14
the least risky option.  Affiliation with any recognized religion was also seen 
as a means of  refuge and securing one's social, cultural and religious identity. 
For instance, it was cited that most Chinese also converted to Christianity 
from Confucianism or Buddhism for fear that they might be associated with 
15
China and Communism.
Another reason cited for this great influx of  new converts to Christianity 
was because Christians were more willing and open to accept ex-
16
Communists while Muslims were relatively reluctant.  Robert Hefner asserts 
that the conversion of  many Javanese to Christianity was as an attempt to 
seek social, political and moral legitimization and to provide answer to 
17
problems of  self-identification in a shattered social order.  Regardless of  the 
above interpretations and explanations, the massive conversion of  
Indonesians to Christianity threatened and angered many Muslims. The 
assumption was that Christians took advantage of  the messy political 
situation to advance their aggressive missionary endeavors by giving a home 
to communist members with a view of  converting them to Christianity. More 
18
significantly, it was seen as a clear attempt to Christianize Indonesia.
The second significant factor that contributed to the Muslims' 
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perception of  the Christians' attempt to Christianize Indonesia was the re-
opening of  missionary activities that allowed Western missionaries to 
propagate Christianity through various mission works in different parts of  
Indonesia. Soeharto's post-1965 New Order government found Christian 
missionaries invaluable to its efforts to implement national development 
programs, especially among outer-island minorities. Western Missionaries 
then had a free hand in establishing new centers for missionary work through 
health, education, economic and social development programs. It proved to 
be of  significant help to the government, since missionaries facilitated 
government aims, such as creating nuclear family households, defining 
individual economic responsibilities, increasing ties to the national and 
global economy, introducing bio-medicine and an improved educational 
system, etc. As pointed out by Lorraine Aragon, the “Soeharto government 
utilized Christian missions as a tool to implement basic economic programs 
especially in the peripheries. It also used the weight of  non-Muslim 
minorities to balance itself  against reformist Muslim groups who 
19
periodically threatened New Order power by agitating for a Muslim state.”  
That the government had become more tolerant towards Christian 
20
missionary activities created tense feelings among Muslims.  In general, 
missionary activities were seen as a hideous means of  proselytization and 
Christianization among many Muslims. Christians were also suspected of  
collaborating with the government to marginalize and to weaken political 
Islam.
The third significant factor was the building of  Christian churches, social 
services, health and educational institutions in places that were largely 
inhabited by Muslims. One of  the earliest Muslim discourses on 
Christianization, which appeared during the earlier years of  the New Order 
Era, was the result of  the complaints made by the majority Muslims in 
Meulaboh, Aceh, against a newly built Methodist Church in that area. The 
Muslims' anger was stimulated by the fact that the church building was built 
in a place where they claimed the majority of  the people were Muslims. This 
issue was brought to political authorities of  the province, who later decided 
21
that the church should be moved to a place not offensive to the majority.  
Lukman Harun, a reformist Muslim activist accused Christians of  building 
churches in Muslim villages when almost no Christian lived there. For him, 
these Christian aggressive missionary activities were contrary to the true 
spirit of  tolerance based on Pancasila. He also questioned whether it is 
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ethical for Christians to evangelize people who already have a religion.
The fourth sensitive issue was the use of  foreign aid for religious 
propagation and missionary advancement. In response to the parliamentary 
question issued by Christian representatives, the Muslim faction in the 
parliament also proposed a parliamentary question on the issue of  foreign 
aid to finance religious institutions and missionary programs in Indonesia. 
This question demanded that the Indonesian government should control 
foreign aid for religious institutions. Obviously, this issue was directed 
towards Christians who were receiving much larger foreign aid than the 
Muslims. In response to Simorangkir's speech, Lukman delivered his own 
piece on the question of  foreign aid for religious institutions and the threats 
of  Christian missions due to the existence of  foreign aid. Lukman insisted 
that foreign aid was a kind of  foreign intervention in Indonesian internal 
affairs and it disturbs the positive spirit of  tolerance among different 
religious groups in Indonesia. With that he accused Christians of  having 
23
adopted “unacceptable missionary methods to convert Muslims.”  One of  
these questionable methods was the unexpected door-to-door visits of  
Christian missionaries to Muslim homes giving material aid, like food, 
medicine and other goods, to poor Muslims. Lukman suggested that the 
government should control foreign aid and that all foreign aid should be 
channeled through the Department of  Religion. He also suggested that 
missionary activities should be restricted only to those who are outside of  the 
24
recognized religions.
This perception of  foreign aid as 'dangerous' intervention coincides with 
Armour's observation in his book Islam, Christianity and the West that generally 
foreign aid used for missionary purposes is viewed by many Muslims as the 
attempt of  the Western Christians to destroy Islam. To that extent, it should 
25
be expected that the response of  many Muslims will be hostile.  
Representative Christian Response:
Questions and Appeals to Religious Freedom and Tolerance
The demands of  Muslim leaders to prohibit the building of  churches in 
largely Muslim communities and to restrict and control foreign aid and 
missionary activities was generally viewed by Christians as a suppression of  
religious freedom, which to their understanding is against the principle of  
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Pancasila. In response to the action of  the provincial government to relocate 
the church building in Meulaboh, the Christian faction in the parliament, 
together with the representatives of  the Indonesian Protestant party 
(Parkindo) and the Catholic party (Partai Katolik), issued a parliamentary 
26
question concerning the issue of  religious freedom.  Simorangkir, a 
Christian parliamentarian, explained that the basis of  the parliamentary 
question that was issued by Christian leaders was the Aceh Ulama Council 
statement dated April 18, 1967, concerning a newly built church in 
Meulaboh. The Ulama stated that Aceh is a special territory of  Indonesia, 
where Islam and custom are interconnected. In this regard, the Ulama 
Council of  Aceh demanded the government of  Aceh to withdraw the 
permission that allows for the building of  churches in West Aceh, especially 
in Meulaboh city and near surroundings. The government of  Aceh acceded 
to this demand and offered to help the process of  moving the church to a 
non-offensive place where Christians can observe and practice their worship 
freely. Simorangkir had intimated that the statement of  the Ulama's and the 
action of  the provincial government, which favored the Muslims' demand to 
move the newly built Methodist church, forced them to bring up a 
parliamentary question, the content of  which deserves to be cited here in full 
for thorough analysis:
1. Does the government agree with us that the case in Meulaboh can be seen as a 
destruction of  the spirit of  tolerance among religious adherents in Indonesia?
2. Does the government agree with us that the case was a kind of  skepticism with respect 
to performing a pure application of  the first principle of  Pancasila?
3. Does the government agree with us that any attitude of  any group or anybody that 
hinders or curtails religious freedom means a rejection of  human rights respected by 
all of  us?
4. Does the government agree with us that if  no. 3 happened, it will destroy the climate 
of  national unity under the supervision of  the New Order?
5. Does the government agree with us that this kind of  case will influence the possibility 
for the People's Consultative Assembly to prepare a declaration for human rights?
6. Is the government ready to take preventive or repressive steps, directly or indirectly, in 
order that this kind of  case will not occur anymore in the Republic of  Indonesian 
27
state that is based on Pancasila?   
Quite clearly, the Christians' arguments, as reflected in these 
parliamentary questions, were centered on the issue of  religious freedom, 
which to them is one of  the basic principles of  the Pancasila. These 
questions, however, did not only reflect a religious conviction, but they also 
appeal to the sensitivity of  the New Order's ideological and political 
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sentiments. The idea of  the pure and consistent implementation of  the 
Pancasila, for instance, jives well with the New Order's declaration to apply 
Pancasila as the absolute and pure ideology of  the state. And so, in a subtle 
manner, Simorangkir suggests that moving the church out of  Meulaboh, as 
supported by the local government, was a violation of  the pure intent of  the 
Pancasila. This issue had provoked many responses from Muslims, 
Christians as well as from the government. There were hints from some 
government figures that this controversy was a new Communist strategy to 
28
divide Indonesians along religions lines.
The Response of  the New Order: 
“Absolute religious freedom, no! Foreign aid, yes!”
The brewing tension between Muslims and Christians was tackled in a 
plenary session of  the Indonesian Parliament on July 14, 1967. In dealing 
with the question of  religious freedom raised earlier by Simorangkir, 
Saifuddin Zuhri, the Minister of  Religion, explained that historically West 
Aceh district and especially the city of  Meulaboh, were almost entirely 
Islamic. Among the residents were a few Christians who bought the land to 
establish the Methodist Church with the permission of  the local 
government. Initially the residents of  West Aceh did not understand the 
purpose of  buying the land. After having informed about the purpose of  the 
land the residents objected saying that it is not good to build a church at the 
center of  the Muslim community, because it hurt their feelings very much. 
He said that indeed, Pancasila prescribes religious tolerance, however, any 
effort to develop religious life should consider the real and specific 
conditions that can be found in a region. He also explained that the Muslim 
community was already suffering from economic difficulties and therefore 
the degree of  their ability to afford religious development projects was very 
29
low.
This seems to suggest that due to their poverty, Muslims became quite 
sensitive to the newly built church, because they could not do a same similar 
project for their own religious life. He then concluded that religious freedom 
should be tempered by sensitivity to other people's feelings. While religious 
groups are entitled to freedom to build places of  worship, using this freedom 
should not offend or hurt the feelings of  other groups, because to use the 
right of  freedom that exceeds its boundaries in a sense that one prefers 
his/her own interest without regard to the feelings of  others is a wrong way 
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of  using freedom. Zuhri also argued that being in the majority, Indonesian 
30
Muslims had been quite tolerant with religious minorities.  This position 
seemed to favor and support the argument taken by the Muslims in Aceh. It 
goes without saying that Zuhri believed the Muslims were angered and had 
reacted violently, because Christians were insensitive to their feelings (maybe 
of  being psychologically feeling threatened) and that in their aggressive 
missionary attempts Christians were in a sense misapplying, or more so, 
abusing religious freedom. This is obvious in Zuhri's response, although he 
said this in an indirect and gentlemanly manner. The Christians still opposed 
the provision to restrict missionary activities. They justified their position 
both theologically and politically by invoking the provision of  religious 
freedom in Pancasila and by pointing to the Islamic da'wa, which was carried 
31
out systematically in predominantly Christian areas.
Again, in response to Lukman's question on foreign aid for religious 
purposes and concerning his demand to restrict missionary activities, Zuhri 
explained that in principle, the government has no objection to foreign aid 
for religious institutions provided it is not binding. He also explained that due 
to the economic crisis the government could not financially support religious 
developments in the country and so foreign aid might fill this gap. He agreed 
with Lukman however that the government should really have control over 
foreign aid and foreign aid must not be used to hurt feelings of  others and 
must take into account psychological dimensions, i.e. Muslim feelings. This 
position of  the Minister of  Religion was substantiated by Soeharto's national 
speech in front of  the Parliament on August 16, 1967. Soeharto explained 
that the state guarantees religious freedom for every citizen, but he also 
insisted that religious propagation should not hurt the feelings of  other 
religious groups. Based on Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, religious 
freedom is guaranteed and therefore there is no reason to make a distinction 
between a religious minority and the majority. He concluded that foreign aid 
32 
for religious institutions was welcome in Indonesia.
The Christians, although, were not very much satisfied with the 
declaration of  the government, but they were somewhat relieved that foreign 
aid was still welcome in Indonesia. Muslims, on the other hand, were not 
really satisfied with the way the government was handling the issue and 
pursued their parliamentary question on the Christians' usage of  foreign aid 
for religious expansion. However, for the sake of  political stability the 
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government pressured Islamic groups to stop discussing the issue.  Clearly, 
Soeharto wanted to appear neutral and tried to reconcile the arguments of  
both sides by skipping away with the more sensitive and delicate details of  
the issue.
The tensions caused by the parliamentary questions and the frustrations 
of  Muslims with the government's seemingly unfavorable policies had led to 
another violent reaction. On October 1, 1967, a group of  Muslim youths in 
Makassar, South Sulawesi, destroyed about twenty Christian churches and 
34
burned bibles.  While Muslims say that it was a sort of  a personal vengeance 
on a Christian teacher who maliciously maligned the Prophet Muhammad by 
accusing him as adulterous, it could also be interpreted in a broader sense, as 
something triggered by the perception of  the aggressiveness of  Christian 
activities amidst Muslim communities. Christians reacted strongly to these 
attacks and called it 'well planned' and 'organized attacks'. They said that 
three months before the attack the two radio stations in Makassar were 
already airing provocative Muslim preaching, and during the attack there 
were loud speakers from the mosques shouting “Allahu Akbar, defend your 
religion, be a martyr.” The Makassar attack became a national issue and 
provoked a lot of  arguments, both from Muslims and Christians. Some 
Muslims like Natsir said that the attack was not good but for him the case was 
a sign of  Muslims' disgust over the Christians' aggressive missionary 
activities. Some suggested that the attack should be understood from the 
recent Meulaboh case where missionaries went on door-to-door visits to 
Muslim homes. Christians did not agree to this kind of  reasoning. Again, 
they insisted that the action was against Pancasila and urged the government 
to take action against it. They lamented that the authorities did not do 
anything to prevent Muslim aggression. Simurangkir, in his speech to the 
national congress of  Parkindo in Bandung, 1967, responded to the issue and 
in some ways acknowledged that Christians might have adopted certain ways 
that might have offended Muslims. However, he maintained that the 
problem is not aggressiveness of  certain missionaries but religious 
35
freedom.  
Representative Muslim-Christian Debates:
On Issues of  Religious Freedom and Tolerance 
In response to the Makassar attack, the government organized an Inter-
religious Consultation on November 30, 1967, to resolve the conflict. The 
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main purpose of  the consultation was to present the proposed draft of  
charter, which contained rules and agreements on mission and religious 
propagation and at the same time the creation of  the Inter-religious 
Consultation Board. The draft was prepared earlier and was presented during 
the consultation, hoping that in spite of  their seemingly irreconcilable 
positions the two contending parties would finally come to an agreement. 
One of  the proposed regulations was that religious propagation should not 
be directed towards people who already have a religion. The Christian 
representatives disagreed and proposed an alternative formulation, in which 
it was stated that “without reducing religious freedom, religious propagation 
should avoid ways that could engender inter-religious tension.” They insisted 
that Christians are bound to a divine mandate to proclaim the gospel and it is 
their duty to share it with others. In general, they argued that the decrees were 
unconstitutional because they were against the religious freedom granted by 
the 1945 constitution. In their official response they said that national unity 
and development should not be opposed to religious freedom, because it is a 
fundamental human right that the state must protect. After some heated 
discussions, the government affirmed the earlier proposal, reaffirming the 
government's position that religious propagation should not be directed to 
people who already have religion. Soeharto also maintained his position that 
religious freedom should not hurt the feelings of  others.  This decision of  
the government was resented by Christians who consequently refused to sign 
the agreement. Thus, the consultation came to a deadlock and led to more 
36
personal and insulting rhetoric.
Here, Mujiburrahman observes that in addressing the issue on restriction 
of  missionary activities the Christians developed a nationalistic rhetoric for 
the simple reason that as a minority they felt that a nationalist ideology was 
the best option to protect their interests in the midst of  the Muslim majority. 
Also they may be keenly aware that the political context was also conducive 
to the nationalist rhetoric. The ideological battle between the secular 
nationalists and the Islamic oriented groups recurred again in this period. In 
this regard, the Christians, the army and the secular Muslims were against 
37
Islamic ideology.  Mujiburrahman also observes that the Muslims on the 
other hand resorted to historical and cultural apologetics. They claimed that 
while Muslims who are in the majority had played a significant role in gaining 
Indonesia's independence against colonizers and had remained very 
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nationalistic now other people seem to forget this contribution and accused 
Muslims of  being non-nationalists and anti-Pancasila. They also resorted to 
cultural apologetic referring to the West and Christians for their arrogance of  
cultural superiority and their attempt to dominate non-western cultures. 
They insisted that Christians' idea of  tolerance is Western and is taken to 
mean that Islamic society should keep silent, even if  they see that Muslims 
are Christianized everywhere in all kinds of  ways, including material 
persuasion. They also said that Christians' arrogance was rooted in their 
doctrine that the world was divided into two sides: the 'damned' and the 
'saved' and the duty of  Christians is to save the damned by converting them 
38
to Christianity.
The Christians believed that in order to solve inter-religious disputes, 
they just have to go back to the law of  the state and the Pancasila. They 
insisted on religious tolerance, though in some ways they also agreed that it 
should be exercised in accordance with the 'noble ethics of  conscience' and 
the order of  the applied law. In the consultation, the Christians also tried to 
convince the Muslim leaders that there was nothing to worry about Christian 
missions. This did not convince the Muslims. Instead, the Muslims blamed 
Christians for the failure of  the consultation. Thus, more squabbles and 
bickering ensued and fueled more animosities between the two factions. 
Hamka, for instance in his response to Tambunan's statement that the 
consultation was not actually a total failure, had bluntly said that he too thinks 
that the consultation was successful and positive for both Christians and 
Muslims. It was positive for Christians, because in the consultation they 
openly declared that it was their sacred mission to proselytize Muslims. It was 
also positive for Muslims, because now they are strongly convinced that the 
Christians would not be happy unless Muslims followed their religion. It was 
also positive for Muslims because now they are more aware of  the Christian 
39
threat of  a new style of  crusade funded by foreign countries.
Representative Muslim leaders also alluded to the declaration of  the 
World Council of  Churches in a meeting of  the Commission on World 
Mission and Evangelization in Geneva attended by a Christian and Muslim 
participant from Indonesia, strongly urging Christian churches and 
organizations to “suspend their misused diaconia activities in the world of  
Islam.” The conference further urged that all material assistance donated by 
outside churches and organizations “henceforth be distributed whether 
40
possible through or in cooperation with the governments.”  It seems to 
appear that while Christians were accusing Muslims of  violating the spirit of  
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the Pancasila, the Muslims were implicitly accusing Christians of  violating 
and contradicting the pure intention of  the declaration of  the World Council 
of  Churches that prohibits Christians to engage in questionable means of  
propagating the Christian faith. In spite of  that, the Indonesian Christian 
community refused to accept what they perceived to be a politically 
motivated restriction of  their religious self-understanding and activity and 
pointing again to the fact that since Islamic da'wa among Christians is not 
affected by this policy it could only be understood as a move against 
41
Christians.
Summary and Reflections
Generally, 'Christianization' in New Order Indonesia was perceived by 
many Muslims as a conscious and willful political and religious attempt to 
impose Christianity and to eradicate Islam in Indonesia. At the core of  the 
issue was the accusation of  representative Muslim leaders that Christians 
were using questionable means and approaches in propagating the Christian 
faith and converting Muslims to Christianity, which include the building of  
churches and other related institutions in predominantly Muslim areas and 
communities, aggressive missionary door-to-door visits to Muslim homes, 
the use of  diaconia and social services as means of  proselytizing and 
converting Muslims to Christianity and Western intervention through 
foreign aid for missionary activities. To resolve this issue of  Christianization, 
representative Muslim leaders demanded that the government should 
prohibit Christians from building churches and related institutions in places 
and communities where Muslims are in the majority, control and regulate 
foreign aid, which is often used as a tool for evangelization and proselytizing 
activities, and restrict religious missions only to people who have no religion.  
For Muslims, the restrictions on Christian missionary activities and foreign 
aid were important not only because they posed a threat to the majority status 
of  Islam in Indonesia, but also because they saw it as an antidote to prevent 
conflict and violent confrontation
Of  course, the feared Christianization campaign that will finally 
eliminate Islam did not take place, at least not during the New Order Era. As 
pointed out by Mark Woodward, in the late 1980s and 90s Indonesian society, 
the government and even the armed forces became much more self-
consciously Islamic. Attendance at Friday prayers and the percentage of  
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people fasting during the month of  Ramadan increased dramatically. 
Thousands of  mosques were built, some with support from a foundation 
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supported by the Soeharto family.  By the end of  the 1980s, overflowing 
crowds praying in the streets were a common sight on Fridays. Soeharto 
himself  went on the Hadj. Islamic publishing flourished and Soeharto 
endorsed the founding of  the Association of  Muslim intellectuals and the 
43
establishment of  an Islamic Bank in 1990.
In response to the Muslims' demand to restrict missionary activities and 
foreign aid, representative Christian leaders argued for religious freedom and 
tolerance as a basic religious right, affirmed and provided by the Pancasila. 
To them, this religious freedom does not only include the freedom to 
practice one's own religion, but to propagate the same as it is mandated of  
every Christian to be a witness for Christ and to his saving activity in the 
world. The building of  places of  worship and Christian missionary activities 
are therefore inherently in line with this freedom. In that sense, to restrict 
Christian missionary activities and to prohibit Christians from building their 
churches was viewed by many Christians as a clear violation of  their religious 
freedom and a senseless disregard of  the pure and noble intention of  
Pancasila that provides for such basic right. To resolve the conflict, 
representative Christian leaders insisted that the basic human and religious 
right and freedom as embodied in the Pancasila must be respected and 
acknowledged by all. To them, the source of  conflict is not in their so-called 
aggressive and offensive missionary activities, but in the inability of  their 
Muslim counterpart to respect and acknowledge the rule of  Pancasila.
How religious freedom is supposed to be defined and understood is 
really an important consideration here. It seems that while Pancasila provides 
this basic religious right to all officially recognized religions of  Indonesia, 
there is no clear definition and explanation on how it is supposed to be 
interpreted and actualized. Muslims and Christians were at odds on this issue 
and had different understanding of  the meaning of  religious freedom. The 
Muslims viewed religious freedom (as expressed by Rasjidi, a prominent 
Muslim leader and reformist) as simply the “freedom to practice one's 
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religion in one's religious community.”  For Christians, on the other hand, 
religious freedom does not only mean individual freedom to practice or live 
out one's religion with in his/her own faith community, but the freedom to 
preach and share the gospel with others. It is also the freedom to build new 
Jerson Benia Narciso: Christianization in New Order Indonesia (1965-1998)
421
places for worship, to hold religious assemblies, to preach religion to people 
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of  another religion and to change religion.
Relative to the question of  the definition and meaning of  religious 
freedom is also the definition and meaning of  religious tolerance. Christians 
insisted that in consonance with their basic religious freedom Muslims must 
show some degree of  openness and tolerance towards them. However, 
again, how tolerance is supposed to be defined and understood was another 
problem. As it appears, the idea of  tolerance is rather complex. Nikiforoya 
points out that the limits of  tolerance are wide and mobile, ranging from 
indifferent neglect of  'otherness', to the urge to support and protect it. In the 
historical sense, tolerance means to concede to a lesser evil in order to avoid a 
bigger one, i.e. it always means the priority of  one's own values and 
simultaneously tolerance towards those who are different and often treated 
as inferior. Tolerance is not only a policy or legislation, but also the emotional 
state of  a person. It forms under the influence of  social processes, as well as 
under individual experiences. Tolerance also depends on the level of  society, 
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traditionalism or modernity.  Nikiforoya believes that the cultural 
differences over this question create some serious problems. What is 
religious freedom for example from the viewpoint of  Islamic culture and 
from the viewpoint of  Christian culture, which is obviously influenced by 
Western culture? Some scholars, like James Piscatori, admit that Islam and 
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the West are at opposite poles with respect to human rights and tolerance.  
In the context of  a highly heterogeneous society like Indonesia to define 
religious freedom and tolerance is really a daunting challenge.
Hamman and Buck define tolerance as a “policy of  patient forbearance 
in the presence of  something which is disapproved of  or disliked. It is the 
recognition of  the necessity to provide opportunities for other persons to be 
agents of  their own ideas, faiths or behaviors. More importantly, the 
principle of  tolerance promotes understanding and appreciation of  many 
48
values espoused by various religions.”  In other words, tolerance does not 
only include forbearance of  something disliked, but on a positive note it also 
includes such definitions as acceptance, openness and complementarity. It is 
not a matter of  saying: “We don't need you, and we would rather that you 
were not around, but we will put up with you and leave you alone, so long as 
you leave us alone.” Rather, it is a matter of  saying: “We acknowledge that 
you are different from us but we respect and accept our differences therefore 
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our differences should not really be a ground for discord but an opportunity 
to compliment and cooperate with one another for our common good.”
Harold Coward asserts that respect for other religious beliefs is the true 
basis of  tolerance. For him, tolerance for others does not mean that we give 
up our critical awareness. Within a relationship of  open respect, we can 
honestly and constructively criticize one another from the criteria of  our 
own deeply-held beliefs. Standing secure in our differences we are 
encouraged to constructively criticize and to learn from one another. Our 
criticism is to be constructive, tolerant and undergirded by a moral 
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compassion toward others.  Wilfred Cantwell Smith holds that religious 
tolerance involves the overcoming of  'one-way thought', which is the real 
enemy of  religious tolerance. He insists that the theological bases of  
tolerance should not be neglected here. There would seem to be a problem if  
openness, tolerance and compassion are subordinated to a given religion's 
higher and more compelling claims for unique and absolute truth. The need 
is not only for tolerance but should move to cooperation and partnership. He 
suggests a reformulation of  theology that is attuned to contemporary 
history, i.e. to re-evaluate the notion of  finality and absolute claims in the 
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light of  plurality.
How Christians reacted to the issue of  'Christianization' as viewed from 
the perspective of  Muslim leaders is not clear. What really are the conditions 
that warrant such religious misconduct? Is Christianization something that 
always has a negative connotation? J.B. Banawiratma, a Catholic professor at 
the Indonesian Consortium for Religious Studies (ICRS) in Yogyakarta, 
Indonesia, differentiates 'Christianization' from the notion of  faith sharing 
where individual and communal human rights are concerned. He maintains 
that “Christian mission or Islamic dakwah in the sense of  sharing of  faith and 
giving witness are acts of  communication. Good communication is the one 
that is not misunderstood. But 'Christianization' is 'harshly' forcing people to 
walk through the Christian way of  life. It prevents man or woman from being 
himself  or herself  and therefore a humiliation to the dignity of  human 
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being.”  This definition and understanding of  Christianization raises the 
question of  whether the building of  churches or the mere preaching of  the 
gospel or visits to Muslim homes and the use of  social services as means of  
evangelization should be regarded as acts of  'Christianization'. At any rate, 
Muslims and Christians are at odds on this issue. For Muslims, religious 
freedom must be exercised in a way that it does not encroach on the religious 
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rights and freedom of  others.
The position of  the state on the issue is ambiguous. Firstly, it sided with 
Muslims on the issue of  restrictions on religious propagation, but it also 
sided with Christians on religious freedom as long as this freedom is 
exercised in a manner that does not 'offend' or 'hurt' the feelings of  Muslims. 
Quite clearly, the government failed to define religious freedom specifically 
in the context of  religious plurality in Indonesia. Secondly, the New Order 
government welcomed foreign aid for Christian institutions but also sided 
with the Muslims' demand not to make Muslims the target of  Christian 
mission. Perhaps, these ambiguities on the part of  the government can be 
understood in the light of  the fact that its primary concern was socio-
economic and political stability. And so, the Soeharto government tried to 
keep the political equilibrium by maintaining a 'neutral' but rather ambiguous 
stance on the issue. In his analysis, Mujiburrahman observes that the 
government's efforts at inter-religious dialogue served the state's agenda for 
political stability, not to build harmonious relationship but only to stop the 
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conflict.
As I see it, there is a need to understand the issue of  'Christianization' 
during the New Order in Indonesia from a wider context beyond internal 
considerations. From a broader perspective, the Muslims fear and anxiety 
seemed to proceed from a feeling of  disempowerment and defeat that has 
enveloped the Muslim world and a perception that it is virtually encircled by 
hostile powers not only bent on the destruction of  the community's strength 
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but also on keeping it underdeveloped and dependent.  Radical Muslims 
believe in a 'conspiracy theory' in which Muslims are the victims of  the West. 
Muslims perceive the West as being inherited by the Judeo-Christian 
tradition with an agenda to crush Islam. They also regard the West as having 
an interest in ruling Islamic countries' economies and penetrating their 
cultures. During the New Order Era, the Masyumi activists condemned 
modernization as the continuity of  Western imperialism in the Muslim 
world. To this group, modernization was not only incompatible with Islam, 
but also synonymous with 'Westernization', 'secularization' and 
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'Christianization'.  The history of  the crusades and colonialism and the 
attitude of  superiority that went with them are not forgotten. Some Muslims 
see no difference between those events and the contemporary missionary 
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activities.  How this bitter historical memories of  the past are to be 
overcome and remedied remains one of  the greatest challenges toward 
achieving a more positive Muslim-Christian relationship in general and in 
Indonesia in particular.
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